ADF ships, planes, subs vulnerable to simple drone attacks: experts

Australia’s multi-billion-dollar fleet of F-35s is protected by little more than sun shades and the RAAF’s bigger aircraft, including C-17 Globemasters and KC-30 refuellers, are out in the open on the tarmac at Amberley air base in Queensland.

Potential adversaries don’t have to go any further than Google Maps to see the Australian Defence Force’s multiple vulnerabilities.

“Unfortunately, Google Maps shows almost everything,” says Marc Ablong, senior fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

“You can see the base infrastructure, people on the base, where the guard posts are. You can determine access points, weak points in fence lines. Many of those things are now readily apparent just by studying the mapping capabilities that exist through things like Google Maps.”

Ablong said the ADF needed to significantly upgrade its passive protection of its bases and military kit, with hardened structures, concrete revetments and reinforced bunkers or dugouts.

He said the ADF also needed to fasten delivery of an anti-drone capability to provide active protection of assets.

“It is incredibly easy to track the assets of a nation that thinks it’s at peace,” Kilcullen says.

“A determined state adversary is more than capable of identifying and then targeting these kinds of critical infrastructure using what some people call unconventional strategic strike, the use of special forces drones, infiltrating supply chains and so on.”

Ukraine used drones smuggled into Russia on trucks to destroy billions of dollars worth of aircraft on four separate airfields, including as much as a third of Russia’s strategic bomber fleet.

Operation Spiderweb’s extraordinary success last month prompted Moscow to order shelters for its remaining bombers.

Similarly, Israel used drones to destroy some of Iran’s ageing fleet of F-14 jet fighters.

“Ukraine and Israel have demonstrated that a drone that costs less than $1000 can wreak billions of dollars worth of damage across an airfield,” Ablong said.

Taiwan, which is under constant Chinese challenge, keeps its F-16s under concrete bunkers. Norway does the same with its F-35s.

China has constructed an underground base for its submarines on the island of Hainan.

By comparison, Australia keeps a squadron of F-35s at Tindal air base in the Northern Territory under corrugated tin roofs and the nation’s entire submarine hunter P-8 Poseidon collection is lined up on the tarmac at Edinburgh RAAF base in Adelaide.

“It would be like owning a Ferrari or a Lamborghini and then leaving it on the street outside of your house with the key still in the ignition,” Ablong said.

He said Australia could no longer assume its remoteness made it safer.

“Distance is not a meaningful discriminator anymore. Some of the drone attacks that the Ukrainians undertook travelled more than 4000 miles, which is the distance between Sydney and Perth,” he said.

The Defence Force said the protection of critical assets was a “priority area for work and investment” and that it was continually revising force protection and resilience measures for its personnel, bases, critical infrastructure and capability assets.

“Defence is observing conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, including the evolution of asymmetric capabilities, and applying lessons to Australia’s geographic and strategic circumstances,” the department said in a statement.

Defence said it was “actively investing in Counter-small Uncrewed Aerial Systems (CsUAS)”, which would detect, identify and potentially neutralise hostile drones.

A tender process for the so-called LAND 156 project is underway, Defence said.

American tech company Anduril is also running an anti-drone trial at RAAF Base Darwin.

Under the current timeline, Defence’s anti-drone program is not expected to be fully operational until 2032.